The question of free will is an important question in philosophy. It has occupied the minds of philosophers for over two millennia, and -despite its simplicity- it is one of the deepest, most puzzling quests in philosophy. It can be phrased as follows: We all believe intuitively that we have free will. For example, if we order lunch in a restaurant, we believe that we are free to choose an item from the menu. Provided that we have money to pay for the chosen item and that the restaurant has all the required ingredients, there is no compulsion or necessity to order one item or another; it's all up to us. In fact, we make such decisions all the time. While you are reading this, for example, you decide whether this topic is interesting enough to continue reading. You are a free agent making a free choice. At least so it seems.

Determinism

I could hold against it that you are not making any free choice at all, but that your choices are already determined by the time you make it. They are determined by the present conditions; that is outer conditions, such as environmental factors, events in your world, external necessities and inner conditions such as your genes, mental state, preferences, habits, and so on. I can also argue from a physicalist point of view: All decisions happen in your brain. Your brain is a physical object and the processes inside your brain are ultimately physical processes which have causal relationships. This means that a decision can be viewed as a volitional impulse, or a certain brain state T' at a time t' preceded by another brain state T at a time t, and which is explained by the causal relationship T--> T'.

This view is called determinism. If you prefer a less abstract account, you could say that determinism views the universe as a giant machine. Every event in the universe is caused by antecedent events, which are themselves caused by other events, which are again caused by other events. Every event or phenomenon has thus infinite causal tentacles attached to it and each of these tentacles reach endlessly into the spacetime history of the universe. Human beings including me and you are simply parts of this machine. Whatever you do, whether you sit down on a chair, scratch your head, or blow your nose, is fully determined by antecedent causes and could therefore not have happened otherwise. Hence, free will is an illusion.

Causal determinism argues from the premise that the future is determined by the past. This view is anchored in a mechanistic world view that understands the universe in terms of causal relations. It is illustrated most clearly in the thought experiment of “Laplace's demon” which is named after the 19th century French scientist Marquis de Laplace. The Marquis said in his Essai philosophique sur les probabilités, “We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.”

Libertarianism

Although Laplace's idea of an “iron block universe” is now obsolete, the determinist argument is still compelling. It is difficult to evade the logic of a linked chain of causes. Yet, a clever debater may juxtapose the causal chains of determinism with chains of free decisions and construct a history of free will. To illustrate this, let's go back to the restaurant example. I could say that my choice of lunch is completely free, except for the limitations given by the menu. For example, I would not be able to order a pizza in a sushi restaurant. The limiting factor can be attributed to my antecedent free choice, namely the choice of the restaurant. Yet, this choice was also partly determined by external factors, such as the proximity of the restaurant and the opening hours. Again, I could argue that I have previously chosen my location as well as the time to appear at the location, and so on. What I am doing here, is viewing the same events from a perspective that emphasises volition rather than the external circumstances. I am implying that decisions emanate from me, rather than me being caused to act in a certain way. In other words, my premise is that my decisions are self-caused. Causality cannot be traced back beyond my inner world. The buck stops here. This view is called libertarianism, or rather metaphysical libertarianism in order to distinguish it from political libertarianism.

Metaphysical libertarianism is founded on two assumptions: (1) that human beings are rational agents who posses the capacity of freely choosing one action among various alternatives; (2) that human beings are either exempted from causal determinism, or that causal determinism is not applicable to the mind. There are a few things which speak in favour of this position. For example, it assigns the capabilities of deliberation, self-control, self-moderation, self-guidance, and even self-mastery to human beings. Without these capabilities, human beings would be pretty much like mindless buoys who believe they can swim, while they are really just bobbing up and down in a deterministic ocean. Most importantly, libertarianism assigns moral responsibility for their actions to human beings. Without moral responsibility, there would be no point in punishing or praising people for their actions. There would be no need for laws. Thus libertarians often defend their position by deconstructing determinism:

Hard determinism, which rejects free will altogether, results in several absurdities. First, the absence of free will contradicts our direct experience. We experience the act of making choices as exercising control over future events. Rationality would be impossible without the capacity of choice. Second, the deterministic view invalidates moral quality of actions and ethical choices, since humans follow a plot and are therefore not more responsible for their acts as a machine is responsible for processing a program. A compassionate human being is then simply a compassion machine, while a murderer is a murder machine. Third, the deterministic view does not accommodate recursion well, such as self-awareness and reflection. If we act following a causal behaviour pattern, we can say we are trapped in this pattern until we become aware of it. Once we become aware of the cause and effect of our own behaviour, however, this awareness influences our behaviour, and possibly even changes it persistently. Determinism does not account for this phenomenon. It cannot explain the quantum leap in consciousness required for self-awareness. More generally, it cannot account for the phenomenon of awareness itself.

Problems of libertarianism and indeterminism

As we can see, hard determinism has some flaws. What about its antithesis, libertarianism? – The biggest challenge for libertarians is to explain uncaused volition, that is how decision making ex nihilo actually happens. Libertarians usually choose to argue from either a supernatural or a naturalistic position. The supernatural position is based on the idea that the human mind is exempt from ordinary causality. This is achieved by posing an entity, such as a soul or mind, which exists apart from the causal machinery of the universe. This position amounts to dualism and therefore suffers from the same shortcomings as dualism.

The naturalistic position avoids dualism by claiming that the universe itself is not completely deterministic and that there are indeterministic phenomena -such as quantum phenomena- with unpredictable outcomes, which afford human beings freedom of choice. This argument is not terribly coherent, because even if we assume that the nature of mind is indeterministic at some level, there is nothing gained in terms of freedom. A choice that is in no way determined, is simply a random event. An indeterministic decision is therefore just as unfree as a deterministic decision. For example, an (indeterministic) quantum computer is just a far from making a free choice, as a conventional (deterministic) computer. This means that indeterminism raises exactly the same problems as determinism. In both cases, choices are the result of an anonymous process, rather than the result of the deliberation of a rational agent.

Compatibilism

A solution for this problem was suggested by the British philosopher David Hume (1711-1776). He championed the view that there is no fundamental contradiction between determinism and free will and that both concepts are compatible. He begins with rejecting the notion of reason acting upon volition. In his Treatise of Human Nature he states, “Since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer, that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion.” For Hume it is rather passion, desire, and emotion which cause volition and he concludes -in accordance with the deterministic view- that these are caused and determined by the character, beliefs, and the overall psychological makeup of a person. However, he makes the important distinction that human beings have free will on account of the hypothetical ability to chose differently under different circumstances.

This means: for any given situation, if one either has a different psychological disposition or if the external circumstances are different, then the outcome of the decision will also be different. According to Hume, this is what free will really means, as opposed to coercion, meaning acts brought about through the application of force. Examples for unfree acts would be handing over your money to a robber who holds a gun to your head, or a mentally insane person who acts upon the imposition of hallucinations. More than a century earlier, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) had made a similar argument. He stated quite simply that a person acts freely if that person willed the act while having been able to do otherwise. Hobbes adds that will itself is not free, but only the person exercising it is. The notion that free will equals uncoerced choice is also present in Hobbes argument. Thus for the classical compatibilists, the causal mental factors that effectuate choice are simply a non-issue. Whether they are deterministic or indeterministic in nature doesn't matter, since they are wholly owned by the person who exercises will and makes choices.

Incompatibilism

Needless to say that this argument did not satisfy everyone. Quite a few determinists and libertarians see compatibilism merely as a rhetoric device that evades the problem of free will by shifting perspective to a modal argument without referring to the inner reality of the decision maker. Hence, incompatibilism is the position that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive. The incompatibilist agrees that absence of coercion is necessary for free will, but denies that it is sufficient. According to incompatibilism, free will exists only if (1) there are alternative paths of actions available to the agent, and if (2) the agent is not in any way predetermined to choose one of these paths. This does of course lead back to the question of the nature of decision making: what mental processes are involved in decision making and whether they can be explained with strict causal models.

A Modern View

We have discussed the classical views on free will and determinism. In the meantime, science has gained more insight into the psychological and physiological aspects of decision making. The classical arguments of determinism and libertarianism are still valid, but they neither shed much light on the psychology of decision making, nor on the internal neural workings of decision making. An important modern concept is the subconscious. The subconscious is the part of the mind that operates and processes information outside the focus of awareness. Over the past decades, psychologists have collected convincing evidence not only for its existence, but also for the fact that the vast majority of information that our bodies receive is processed subconsciously, which means without us being aware of it. The subconscious mind can thus be likened to a workhorse with massive parallel processing power and the conscious mind can be likened to a narrowly focused high-energy beam. Both parts of mind are thoroughly connected and operate together as a whole. Decision making can take place either consciously or subconsciously, or perhaps also semi-consciously. What does this imply in view of free will?

Intuitively we might say that subconscious decisions are unfree or to a lesser degree free than conscious decisions. We tend to think that only conscious decisions can be called free, because only these involve reasoning processes, or what we call rational thought. Since rational thinking does not take place subconsciously, subconscious decisions happen mechanically and are therefore in some way predetermined by the existing mental programs and memories. In this regard, subconscious decisions aren't much different from the heartbeat and from other autonomic functions. But what about conscious decision making? Before we discuss this question, we must first ask another question, namely whether decisions generally originate consciously or subconsciously. What about conscious behaviour, like moving an arm, for example? Brain studies have shown that movement, which is controlled by the motor cortex, is preceded by the build-up of an electrical potential in the brain called “readiness potential”. Notably, this readiness potential builds up before the person becomes aware of their intention to move. This observation suggests that volition (to move a body part) takes its beginning in the subconscious mind. Only when there is a sufficient potential becomes the volitional impulse conscious. What are the implications? Do all decisions originate unconsciously? Are we causality-driven robots with the luxury of ex post awareness?

Conscious Self-Reflection And Alternative Realities

The answer to this question lies in the nature of consciousness. There are certainly many mechanical actions we perform with minimal awareness. Breathing, blinking, scratching an itch, walking, or even hitting a sequence of keys on a keyboard to produce a certain word are typical examples of low-level actions, which are often (though not always) performed unconsciously. Emotions, feelings, and volitions all arise subconsciously. Once these mental events rise to the surface and enter the light of consciousness, however, things suddenly change. They take on a different quality on account of being observable. Here is an example: Let us say we get angry about something. As the anger rises within us, we might feel the impulse to bang our fist on the table. Before the table banging action is executed by the body, however, we become aware of our anger as well as of our intention to bang our fist on the table. In a split second, we decide that this is not an appropriate reaction to the situation, because it would offend and irritate people. Consciousness thus steps in, vetoes the decision, and orders the motor cortex to loosen the fist. Now what happened? Did we exercise free will?

The key to understanding this lies is in the phrase “becoming aware”. At the very moment we self-reflect and become aware of our internal state, that same state is inevitably modified. It isn't us modifying our internal state willingly. There is no agent. It is just consciousness affecting our internal processing. As long as we are unaware and not self-reflecting, things take their linear machine-like course. There is only one outcome with near 100% probability, which is acting on the impulse. If there is no awareness of our internal state and of the consequences of our actions, then we can only act on the impulse. Awareness changes this. To use a metaphor from quantum mechanics, one could say that the reverse of a wave collapse occurs. Instead of a single outcome with 100% probability, there are suddenly several superposed possible outcomes, each with n% probability. These are possible courses of action which suddenly become available and accessible to our mind on account of awareness. These alternatives quickly collapse again into a single reality as soon as the mind makes a decision. However, the outcome of that decision may be crucially different from the outcome without self-reflection.

In the above example, consciousness performs the function of a watchful policeman, observing mental events as they move outward from the inner to the outer physical world. Analogously, consciousness stands guard at the doors of perception in the other direction, from the outer to the inner world. For example, audiovisual consciousness may alert us about an approaching vehicle and help us to determine whether body movements are required to avoid collision. However, consciousness does not have the capability to change events on its own. The energy (will) needed to alter the course of events and actions comes from a different source. The role of consciousness is not to intervene, but to create alternative possibilities. Strictly speaking, consciousness does not even create these possibilities. It just reveals them to us. Once the alternative possibilities are revealed, volitional energy might take a different course in the same way as a river might take a different course when it hits upon a newly found channel or trench. As this results in an alteration of the flow of internal (mental) and external (physical) events, it affords us the impression of free will. Yet, it is neither free will in the classical sense, since there is no agent involved, nor is it a strictly mechanical process as suggested by classical determinism.

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