I Disagree With Thomas

[TruthSeeker]

Here's a fun game... :D

Thomas could come up with some argument, exposing the way he views the world, and we all try to object it as much as we can. :P

I'm just intrigued about what Thomas think because of this website. It is "big view", so I expect him to think about unusual connections and relationships within the whole spectrum of human knowledge. I think about that all the time and that is what attracted me to this website- and to this thread.

So Thomas, when you read this, it might be easy to start from the big view...? ;)

[Thomas Knierim]

Okay, I can think of some Philosophy of Mind questions which I find fascinating and which haven't yet been dealt with on this website:

Is consciousness fundamental or emergent? (I think it's fundamental)
Is strong AI possible? (I think not)
Does the brain perform computations? This question can also be formulated as follows: can brain processes be mapped to Turing machine operations or the lambda calculus? (I think not)

If you want to argue any of these propositions, please go ahead...

Cheers, Thomas

[Thomas Knierim]

If I have to make the first pleading, I prefer to discuss the last question if you don't mind. This question is more concrete than the first and therefore -I believe- better suited. If we start discussing the nature of consciousness, we would really just be making metaphysical guesses. We don't know what the nature of consciousness is, although some scientists claim otherwise. Therefore I think it is prudent to start with a topic of which we know at least a little bit, namely of computation and of the brain. So, the question I want to start with is: “Does the brain perform computations?” This is an important question, because if what the brain does is computation, then it should be possible, at least in theory, to build a machine that performs computations in the same way as the brain. In other words, if we can demonstrate that the brain computes, then the case for strong AI is proven. One could even expect the case for materialism to be proven, because if the mental properties of the brain can be reconstructed by a machine, then it is established that mental properties have a material basis.

Before we start, let me clarify some terms. The conjecture that cognition is computation is called computationalism in philosophy. What is computation? Computation in this context is not restricted to digital computers. It is a very general mathematical model which can be applied to all kinds of information processing. Whether information processing occurs by changing bits in RAM, changing magnetic orientation of ferrite cores, changing genes in the DNA sequences, changing the state of neurons, or changing the memory of sentient beings does not matter in view of this abstract model. Information processing can also be understood as problem solving. You have a certain input (the problem), a certain specific way of processing (the algorithm), and an output (the solution). The computational process is generally illustrated by the so-called Turing machine (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine), named after its inventor, the mathematician Alan Turing. A Turing machine is an abstract problem solving device which manipulates symbols. It's not a concrete mechanism, but a theoretical model, and it has been shown that digital computers are a concrete physical implementation of a Turing machine. There is another computation model called the lambda calculus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lambda_calculus), invented by Alonzo Church, which is somewhat more mathematical and relies heavily on recursion. It is equivalent to the Turing machine model, which means that everything that is a Turing machine is also a lambda calculus.

What is “strong AI”? The strong artificial intelligence hypothesis is the claim that once technology is sufficiently advanced, computers will be able to accomplish the full spectrum of cognition and mental capabilities of humans. In particular it means that computers will be able to “reason” and to “understand” things. By contrast, the “weak AI” hypothesis is the claim that computers will not encompass human intelligence and that they will always be limited to emulating human cognition.

Okay, this provides enough material for us to get started. I do not think that the brain performs computation. Using the above definition I can rephrase this: I don't think that the brain is a Turing machine. But let me first outline the opposite argument.

The computationalist argues as follows: The brain is composed of highly connected neurons (nerve cells) each of which functions in a strictly deterministic way. A neuron receives a number of excitatory and inhibitory signals which can be regarded as input. Depending on whether it reaches a certain threshold (the action potential), it either fires or it doesn't fire (output). Hence, neurons can be modelled by a Turing machine. Furthermore, mental states can be mapped to neural states. This means that a specific mental state (for example feeling angry at your dog who is chewing on your trainers) correlates exactly to a certain neural state. Now, when we are thinking, says the computationalist, we process symbolic information, such as sense impressions, concepts, memories, etc. This symbolic information correlates to mental states, therefore everything the brain does is computation. This is where the Church-Turing thesis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church-Turing_Thesis) kicks in. The Church-Turing thesis says: “Everything that is in principle computable, can be computed by a Turing machine.” - Therefore, the brain is a Turing machine. Granted it is an incredibly complex Turing machine which does not bear much resemblance to the original concept, but it fulfils the criteria anyway.

I think this is not the case.

First, the premise that there is an exact correlation between neural states and mental states is unproven, and frankly I don't find it very convincing. We can only detect such a correspondence at a very rough level of abstraction. For example, we can say that certain visual experiences correlate to certain electroencephalogram patterns in the occipital lobe. However, these patterns are subject to considerable variation. There is certainly no such thing as a down-to-the-neuron correspondence. This falsifies the thesis that there is a unique neural state for each mental experience.

Second, I don't think that all brain activity can be reduced to symbol manipulation, although a lot of it can. The problem is that symbols cannot always interpreted systematically. This basically boils down to the question whether the brain behaves algorithmically or not. I think doesn't.

Third, a related issue is semantics. It would not make sense to say that a Turing machine understands the algorithms it performs or the symbols it manipulates, or at least it has only a very limited understanding of these. For example, a chess program may have an understanding of the movements allowed for a knight or a rook, but it doesn't know what the expressions “knight” or “rook” mean. Humans consider such an understanding essential for reasoning.

Fourth, a Turing machine has no requirement for reflection or self-awareness. I grant that there are many brain activities which don't require self-awareness, such as the autonomic functions and reflexes, for example, but most of the conspicuous capabilities the human race prides itself on, such as complex movements, language, reasoning, thinking, etc. do require self-awareness. I can't see how self-awareness or any awareness at all fits in with the Turing model.

Fifth, a further requirement for our functioning as human beings seems to be embodiment. Our perception and experience is inextricably linked to and therefore dependent on our body. Our brain fulfils myriad sensory, motor, and control functions all of which interact with the human body. This does not really question the brain being a Turing machine, but it questions whether the brain could be “reimplemented” in any other form. -I think not. I think it is totally dependent on its specific embodiment.- If the brain is a Turing machine and if it cannot be anything else than a brain, then Church-Turing thesis and the concept of computation itself is called into question.

Sixth, a Turing machine can -by definition- not solve any uncomputable problem. An uncomputable problem is one that does not fulfil the criteria for computability (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computability_theory_%28computer_science%29) (a term which is formally defined in informatics). Many such uncomputable problems are known. One problem that belongs to this class of uncomputable functions is the proof for the Gödel theorem. However, the Gödel theorem was proved by Gödel, thus it stands to reason that Gödel performed an uncomputable function. How could Mr. Gödel have accomplished this with a Turing machine for a brain?

Cheers, Thomas

[CSwriter1]

Thomas you said so much, I am afraid if I read it all, I will forget what I read first. Your question is most interesting.

I will go with yes, our brains do computations, because the machine that does this can break down. There are 7 brain areas for verbal processing, and anyone of one of them can be damaged with very distinct results. The area controlling site is essential to vision, and therefore reading. The area controlling hearing is essential to hearing. One are is the bank for words, and if it goes down and person will know meanings of words but not the word. Or the other way around, a stroke may lead to a person knowing a lot of words but not there meaning. Such a person may want a glass of water, but instead say, "shut the window". It is a very frustrating communication problem for everyone.

If the bundle of nerves connecting the right and left brain is severed, a person will see only what is in the left or right visual area. They will see only half of their dinner plate and what is on the other half does not exist for them. An assistant will have to turn the plate for the person to see what is on the other half.

Our memory and personalities can also be effected by brain damage. Drugs can effect our brains.

These are all physical/ material changes that change the functioning of our brains. Therefore, our brains do computations.

[CSwriter1]

I need to add, just because our brains do a lot of computing, this does not mean they are limited to this function. Abstract thinking, conceptualizing something like time, is beyond computing. This is what makes us as the gods. We can know the Law and therefore we can have Justice, and we share this in common with God.

[Thomas Knierim]

Thank you, CSWriter.

What you said about brain injuries is correct. For example, we know that injuries to the Broca's area at the base of the frontal lobe causes one form of aphasia, the inability to produce long meaningful sentences. This type of aphasia is called Broca's aphasia. Another type of aphasia that occurs with damage to the Wernicke's area (located at the junction of the temporal and parietal lobe) results in difficulties of understanding speech. People with Wernicke's aphasia often produce long meaningless sentences. There are a several other types of brain injuries which are associated with specific symptoms. For example, damage to the left parietal lobe can lead to Gerstmann’s syndrome which includes the confusion of left and right, impairment of writing (aphasia) and calculation abilities (acalculia), and difficulty with recognising body parts (agnosia).

What you said about "split-brain" patients (the separation of the corpus callosum was once performed as an epilepsy treatment) is also partly correct. The person does actually see both halves of the plate, but each half is seen with an individual hemisphere. This leads to the peculiar effect that the person cannot articulate what is seen in the left visual field. The reason for this is that the input of left visual field is processed in the right hemisphere. The speech centre, however, is located in the left hemisphere. Since the hemispheres are not connected, they cannot communicate with each other, and the person cannot articulate what is seen in the left field.

But what does this suggest in view of how the mind works? It suggests that the mind has a material basis, nothing else. This is something I never questioned. Remember I said above that the function of the brain depends on its embodiment. The material basis of the mind is, of course, the brain and the nervous system. I doubt that anybody would question this in view of today's knowledge of the neuro sciences.

The point to moot is whether brain activity can be reduced to computation and this means computation in the sense of what a Turing machine does. I don't think it can, which implies that the brain is somehow more powerful than a Turing machine. To be totally clear about this, I would also like to add that a lot of the brain functions and cognitive processes are actually computation (I would include conceptualising and reasoning processes into this), while others are not. In particular I can't see how awareness or consciousness is computation. In your addendum you basically agreed with the point of view that the brain “does more than computation”, so we don't really seem to disagree about this.

Cheers, Thomas

[TruthSeeker]

:o

My God! This is so much bettern then my boring IT class... :D

Ok... so I'm going to defend the strong AI hypothesis (despite I don't agree with it... :lol: )

Pardon my clumsiness... english is not my first language...

What is “strong AI”? The strong artificial intelligence hypothesis is the claim that once technology is sufficiently advanced, computers will be able to accomplish the full spectrum of cognition and mental capabilities of humans.
Computers are based on a simple binary model which allows them to be extremely flexible. Given the continuous growth in computer speed and memory space, it follows that all cognition and mental capabilities in humans might someday be emulated in a computer. In fact, the limit for the computer speed is incredible, way over the capacity of the human brain. Capacity-wise, in the future, a computer might be able to compute much more then a human brain can...

In particular it means that computers will be able to “reason” and to “understand” things. By contrast, the “weak AI” hypothesis is the claim that computers will not encompass human intelligence and that they will always be limited to emulating human cognition.
Understanding is simply the capacity of associating a symbol with a meaning, and doing simple comparisons between those symbols. A computer can already do that.


The Church-Turing thesis says: “Everything that is in principle computable, can be computed by a Turing machine.” - Therefore, the brain is a Turing machine. Granted it is an incredibly complex Turing machine which does not bear much resemblance to the original concept, but it fulfils the criteria anyway.
Yes. And it doesn't resemble it because it is quite complex. When we are capable of processing enough information in a computer, such a computer would resemble very little the Turing machine. A Turing machine is just an extremely simple version of the brain. Just like an abacus is a simple version of a calculator!

First, the premise that there is an exact correlation between neural states and mental states is unproven, and frankly I don't find it very convincing. We can only detect such a correspondence at a very rough level of abstraction. For example, we can say that certain visual experiences correlate to certain electroencephalogram patterns in the occipital lobe. However, these patterns are subject to considerable variation. There is certainly no such thing as a down-to-the-neuron correspondence. This falsifies the thesis that there is a unique neural state for each mental experience.
There are patterns of neural states, however. For instance, when the brain records a memory, it can take many pathways, but the computation is the same. It is like the internet! The pathways that the packets go through are random, but the destination, the information and the purpose are the same.

Second, I don't think that all brain activity can be reduced to symbol manipulation, although a lot of it can. The problem is that symbols cannot always interpreted systematically. This basically boils down to the question whether the brain behaves algorithmically or not. I think doesn't.
What do you mean by "symbols cannot always interpreted systematically"?

Everything can be reduced to symbols. Everything has a specific meaning and, thus, a specific symbolic variation. It's like Plato's world of ideas. The chair has a symbol "chair" and a meaning [the abstract meaning]. His "world of ideas" just happen to be abstract itself!

What cannot be reduced to symbols?

Third, a related issue is semantics. It would not make sense to say that a Turing machine understands the algorithms it performs or the symbols it manipulates, or at least it has only a very limited understanding of these. For example, a chess program may have an understanding of the movements allowed for a knight or a rook, but it doesn't know what the expressions “knight” or “rook” mean. Humans consider such an understanding essential for reasoning.
Understanding is simply an association between a symbol and a meaning. We do that all the time when we read poems, for example. When we read poems, we perceive many metaphors and our brains makes connections which are not direct, but indirect, between symbols/meanings and similar symbols/meanings. (I shall call the object of "symbols/meanings" and "idea" for now on- just so that we have a symbol to convey that aggregate meaning... )

Ideas are made through simple association. A little child might associate the word "daddy" with that guy who always change his diapers. It's a simple association. Conversely, a computer can associate "knight" with the knight.

Fourth, a Turing machine has no requirement for reflection or self-awareness. I grant that there are many brain activities which don't require self-awareness, such as the autonomic functions and reflexes, for example, but most of the conspicuous capabilities the human race prides itself on, such as complex movements, language, reasoning, thinking, etc. do require self-awareness. I can't see how self-awareness or any awareness at all fits in with the Turing model.
Why cannot self-awareness be possible for a computer?

Why are we self-aware? It seems to me that we are self-aware because we observe the world around us. Once we observe the world, we look at ourselves and perceive our senses and our control. That senory perception and control is what constitutes what we call "self-awareness". If you can add sensory perceptors to a computer, then a computer can receive external input and distinguish the environment from itself. Maybe it does already, through CD-ROMS, who knows!? How can we know?

Fifth, a further requirement for our functioning as human beings seems to be embodiment. Our perception and experience is inextricably linked to and therefore dependent on our body. Our brain fulfils myriad sensory, motor, and control functions all of which interact with the human body. This does not really question the brain being a Turing machine, but it questions whether the brain could be “reimplemented” in any other form. -I think not. I think it is totally dependent on its specific embodiment.- If the brain is a Turing machine and if it cannot be anything else than a brain, then Church-Turing thesis and the concept of computation itself is called into question.
Once again, we could add sensors to the computer so that it would perceive the environment around it. Sensory perceptions are based on nerves which carry information to the brain. I'm sure there are even blindspots which have no nerves and cannot be sensed (a little educated guess)! Sure in these blindspots, we don't really perceive and that part of our bodies don't "exist" to us. But, of course, those blindspots are very very tiny and virtually imperceptible...

Sixth, a Turing machine can -by definition- not solve any uncomputable problem. An uncomputable problem is one that does not fulfil the criteria for computability (a term which is formally defined in informatics). Many such uncomputable problems are known.
What is the criteria for computability?

One problem that belongs to this class of uncomputable functions is the proof for the Gödel theorem. However, the Gödel theorem was proved by Gödel, thus it stands to reason that Gödel performed an uncomputable function. How could Mr. Gödel have accomplished this with a Turing machine for a brain?
K. I'm gonna try to disprove the first theorem (God help me :lol: )...

No... let me try to understand first...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godel%27s_theorem
"For any consistent formal theory that proves basic arithmetical truths, it is possible to construct an arithmetical statement that is true 1 but not provable in the theory. That is, any consistent theory of a certain expressive strength is incomplete.
Here, "theory" refers to a set of statements. (A theory is in general an infinitely large set.) A theory is "consistent" if it does not prove any contradictions. The meaning of "it is possible to construct" is that there is some mechanical procedure which when given the axioms of the theory, produces another statement. That this statement is not provable in the theory means that it cannot be derived from statements of the theory using the standard rules of first-order logic. The statement produced by the procedure is often referred to as "the Gödel sentence" for that theory, though there are actually infinitely many statements that have the same property (of being true but not provable from the theory).

(Some technical hypotheses have been omitted here; the most important one is the stipulation that the theory be computably enumerable. That is, for Gödel's theorem to be applicable, it must be possible in principle to write a computer program that, if allowed to run forever, would print out all axioms of the theory, and nothing else.)"

So... does that mean that one input would produce more then one possible output?


Have fun! :)

[TruthSeeker]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computability...uter_science%29 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computability_theory_%28computer_science%29)
"The halting problem
Main article: Halting problem
The halting problem is one of the most famous problems in computer science, because it has profound implications on the theory of computability and on how we use computers in everyday practice. The problem can be phrased:

Given a description of a Turing machine and its initial input, determine whether the program, when executed on this input, ever halts (completes). The alternative is that it runs forever without halting.
Here we are asking not a simple question about a prime number or a palindrome, but we are instead turning the tables and asking a Turing machine to answer a question about another Turing machine. It can be shown (See main article: Halting problem) that it is not possible to construct a Turing machine that can answer this question.

That is, the only way to know for sure if a given program will halt on a particular input in all cases is simply to run it and see if it halts. If it does halt, then you know it halts. If it doesn't halt, however, you may never know if it will eventually halt. The language consisting of all Turing machine descriptions paired with all possible input streams on which those Turing machines will eventually halt, is not recursive. The halting problem is therefore called noncomputable or undecidable.

An extension of the halting problem is called Rice's Theorem, which states that all nontrivial properties of the language accepted by a Turing machine are undecidable."

Ah! So how do you know we never "halt", Thomas? :D

[Thomas Knierim]

Truthseeker: Given the continuous growth in computer speed and memory space, it follows that all cognition and mental capabilities in humans might someday be emulated in a computer.

Well, this is a conclusion I hear frequently and I should point out that it is incredibly naive. There are two things to consider. First, Moore's law cannot proceed indefinitely. Moore's "law" states that the capacity/complexity of integrated circuits doubles every two years, which is roughly the case since the 1970s. However, once miniaturisation hits the molecular barrier, Moore's law ends. We are now at a miniaturisation level of approx. 100-50 nanometre per transistor. At this rate we can proceed 10 to 15 years longer before we hit the molecular barrier. We can expect that a 2020 molecular chip will compare to a 2006 chip like a 2006 chip to a 1992 chip. It will run Windows a 100 times faster. -So what?- The second thing to consider is computer architecture. We have been building von Neumann computers in the 1950s and we are still building von Neumann computers today. The von Neumann architecture comes nowhere near the architecture of the brain.

Truthseeker: Understanding is simply the capacity of associating a symbol with a meaning, and doing simple comparisons between those symbols. A computer can already do that.

No, "understanding" is not connecting one symbol with another. "Understanding" is knowing what the symbols do actually stand for. Understanding comes from having experienced the phenomena that the symbol describes. Let me give you an example. Do you think that a 6-year old boy or girl has an understanding of romance and courtship? He/she may have heard a lot of stories about princes and princesses falling in love, seen a few romantic pictures with the parents, perhaps even read romantic literature. So there are dozens, perhaps hundreds of symbols, words, images, and associations available to the child. Still, the young child does not have a complete understanding of romantic love. It has not experienced it.

Truthseeker: A Turing machine is just an extremely simple version of the brain.

A Turing machine is an extremely simple version of a digital computer, but not of the brain. It is possible to mathematically reduce a von Neumann computer to a Turing machine, and this has been demonstrated, but the same thing has not been demonstrated for the brain. In order to say that the brain is reducible to a Turing machine you would have to formalise brain functions and conduct a proof. Good luck!

Truthseeker: There are patterns of neural states, however. For instance, when the brain records a memory, it can take many pathways, but the computation is the same. It is like the internet! The pathways that the packets go through are random, but the destination, the information and the purpose are the same.

This comparison is inadequate. An IP data packet that travels the Internet has a certain information content which represents certain symbols. A nerve impulse that travels a neural pathway is just an impulse; it doesn't carry any symbolic information. A neural pathway can be likened to a cable. Take for example the axon pathways that run from the motor cortex down the spine. They are the longest neural pathways we know. Their job is to activate motor neurons. The transmission signal is either "on" (contract) or "off" (relax). The view that neural pathways somehow represent symbolic information is probably misguided.

Truthseeker: Everything can be reduced to symbols.

I don't dispute that. However, it is important to note that symbolic operation is a property of the mind; it is not a property of the brain. Symbols themselves are mental. They are the very thing that distinguishes the mental from the physical. By contrast, physical objects generally function non-symbolically. Scientists have been studying the living brain for decades and they have never been able to detect any symbolic code in it.

Truthseeker: Understanding is simply an association between a symbol and a meaning. We do that all the time when we read poems, for example. When we read poems, we perceive many metaphors and our brains makes connections which are not direct, but indirect, between symbols/meanings and similar symbols/meanings.

We already touched upon this question above and I said that understanding is not simply connecting one symbol with another. Since this leads directly to the core of the mind/body problem, which is the centre piece of philosophy of mind, let me pick it up again. Meaning comes from understanding and understanding comes from (a) knowing what the symbol stands for, and (b) knowing these objects, concepts, or events themselves. For example, when I talk about a tree, you know the object I am talking about, because you have experienced trees. You have seen trees, you have touched bark and leaves, and maybe you have climbed some of them when you were younger. In order for you to understand the full meaning of trees, you must posses this knowledge of type (b). In other words, you must know what it is like, to see, touch, smell, hear trees. These are called the phenomenal properties. Without knowledge of the phenomenal properties, your understanding is incomplete. There is another famous example which involves bats. We know that bats have a sense of echolocation which they use to navigate and to find prey. This echolocation sense is enormously accurate and it allows them to navigate fast and precisely at zero visibility (i.e. in the dark). Now, we know a lot about bats, about the physical principle of echolocation, about the behaviour of bats, about bat brains, and so on. But even with all this knowledge we don't know what it is like to be a bat. Even a bat reseracher who has studied bats all his life doesn't know what it is like to have a sense of echolocation and fly in the dark. In other words, we lack knowledge of the phenomenal properties; we lack first-person experience. No amount of symbolical understanding can give us this experience.

This is why computers do not "understand". Computers are limited to symbolical representations of objects. They are in fact an extension of our own mind, but they lack knowledge of phenomenal properties.

Truthseeker: It seems to me that we are self-aware because we observe the world around us. Once we observe the world, we look at ourselves and perceive our senses and our control. That senory perception and control is what constitutes what we call "self-awareness". If you can add sensory perceptors to a computer, then a computer can receive external input and distinguish the environment from itself.

We have two types of awareness. We have sensory awareness of the objects in our environment through vision, hearing, touch, smell, and taste, and we have self-awareness. It is possible to equip a computer with sensors, cameras, and even to create some type of self-awareness by implementing reflective programs, self-organising algorithms, and the like. This has already been done on large scale, for example in robotic/industrial applications. Did this give us thinking machines or conscious robots? -No, it didn't.- We produced automata that can interact with physical objects. That's all. The information inside these automata is symbolic. Automata don't have experiences. They don't have consciousness.

Truthseeker: What is the criteria for computability?

Click on this link (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computability/) and you will find a good introduction into computability theory. In informatics, it is important to make a distinction between uncomputable and intractable problems. Uncomputable problems are problems that cannot be solved, even with infinite time and memory. Intractable problems are problems that cannot be practically solved, i.e. with a "reasonable" amount of time and memory. These problems are defined in complexity theory. For example, EXP-complete problems are intractable as they require exponential polynomial resources on a deterministic machine. Many people also think that NP-complete problems are intractable. With our current computers, however, we can only solve deterministic/polynomial (P-class) problems.

Truthseeker: Ah! So how do you know we never "halt", Thomas?

Well, obviously we do and that is exactly the point. If we had Turing machines for brains then a problem like proving the incompleteness theorem could not be solved even if our brain was capable of non-deterministic operations and even if it had an infinite number of neurons. Since we did solve the problem of proving it, or rather Mr. Gödel did, the human brain (such as the one owned by Gödel) must be what computability theory calls an "oracle". Also see: Oracle machine (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oracle_machine) on Wikipedia.

Cheers, Thomas

[TruthSeeker]

Ok. This is very overwhelming...

I will be back when I can prove that the brain is a Turing machine... :D :lol:

[TruthSeeker]

I need some... JAVA POWER!
*drinks coffee, turns into Super Java*

:lol:


(Sorry, it's nearly midnight and I cannot think logically right now... :D )

[scameter]

May I ask you something Thomas, regarding part of what you said: you said that symbolic thought is of the mind, not the brain. Do you consider them seperate? And if so, how so?

[Thomas Knierim]

Scameter: May I ask you something Thomas, regarding part of what you said: you said that symbolic thought is of the mind, not the brain. Do you consider them seperate? And if so, how so?

This is a metaphysical question, Scameter, and obviously I cannot answer it. There are two basic positions, dualism and monism. Dualism holds that matter and mind are two different substances and monism holds that there is only one substance. Of monism, there are again two types: materialism, which says everything is matter, and idealism, which says that everything is mind. Each of these three metaphysical positions (dual/mat/ideal) is untenable IMV, that is, they all have quite strange, even absurd logical consequences. Therefore, I am leaning towards a compromise. For practical purposes I assume property dualism. This means I assume that there are material and mental properties, and that they are different, but that mental properties supervene on the material ones. This allows me to describe the world in a reasonably coherent fashion. Ultimately, I think that dualism is false and that consciousness is as fundamental as matter. This means that there is one substance which has both material and mental properties. This is a quite difficult notion, however, and it is not very practical for everyday problems.

Cheers, Thomas

[CSwriter1]

Sorry Thomas, in a formal debate I should argue you, but once again I find you what you say agreeable. I believe Spinoza said basically the same thing. Everything is God stuff.

How can there be matter without energy, or energy without matter?
Hydrogen somehow plays a part in this, but I forget how. Somehing happened and there was hydrogen, and then all other elements evolved out of hydrogen. It could have gone differently and then there would be no universe, right? Everything interacts with everything else? Would not that interaction be consciousness?

I am thinking of a stone dropped in a lake, and the ring of ripples that occur. The action will get the same results on earth or anywhere in the universe where there are stones and water. That is to say, there is an order and if there is order doesn't something have to enforce that order? I don't know. I am at the edge of my ability to comprehend.

[TruthSeeker]

Ultimately, I think that dualism is false and that consciousness is as fundamental as matter. This means that there is one substance which has both material and mental properties.
Then why do you say the brain cannot be a Turing machine because Turing machines don't have consciousness? Maybe they could have both material and mental properties... ;)

[scameter]

I see what you're saying Thomas, and I do somewhat agree. But, as you would seem to agree, I cannot reasonably say that there is or is not more to existence than the material; I know of many odd, absurd things, as well as many spiritual teachings, as well as many empirical and scientific teachings, and both seem to be mainly that: teachings. How can we truly know which one is true, or at least more true than the other? I believe nothing is certain, thus it is simply impossible for me to make a definite deduction based on the claims proposed by philosophies such as monism and dualism, as well as idealism, spirituality, religion, and empiricism. But, you do seem to believe at least to some degree that there is more than the physical, what you call "mind" or "mental". May I ask what exactly it is you mean by this? Do you consider mind to be physically tangible, or is it divine? What part does it play in life?

[Thomas Knierim]

TruthSeeker: Then why do you say the brain cannot be a Turing machine because Turing machines don't have consciousness? Maybe they could have both material and mental properties...

Because Turing machines are nonmaterial (despite the name which implies physicality). ;)

Scameter: How can we truly know which one is true, or at least more true than the other?

You can't. The available epistemological methods cannot provide any insights about metaphysical propositions, such as dualism, monism, physicalism, etc. Nevertheless, many people have opinions about metaphysical propositions, which are derived from other (disputed) epistemological methods. The classical example of such a disputed method is revelatory insight, which is often cited by religious people, especially Christians.

The case about revelatory insight is quite an interesting one. For example, one could hold that consciousness itself is revelatory.

Scameter: But, you do seem to believe at least to some degree that there is more than the physical, what you call "mind" or "mental". May I ask what exactly it is you mean by this?

Well, it should be obvious to you what mind is. I am referring to mind in the common meaning of the word, i.e. as ...the collective aspects of intellect and consciousness which are manifest in some combination of thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination. (Wikipedia). Attempting to define mind in an exact manner is very difficult, however. It has not yet been successfully done.

Scameter: Do you consider mind to be physically tangible, or is it divine?

Nothing of that.

Scameter: What part does it play in life?

It is probably as vital to the universe as matter. Not human mind, but the principle that underlies human mind, whatever that may be.

Cheers, Thomas

[scameter]

The available epistemological methods cannot provide any insights about metaphysical propositions, such as dualism, monism, physicalism, etc. Nevertheless, many people have opinions about metaphysical propositions, which are derived from other (disputed) epistemological methods. The classical example of such a disputed method is revelatory insight, which is often cited by religious people, especially Christians.

Exactly my point. We can't know anything for certain, much less any actual truths about the universe or it's metaphysical attributes; it's all opinion, which is why no knowledge is truly objective.

The case about revelatory insight is quite an interesting one. For example, one could hold that consciousness itself is revelatory.

I agree. From a certain point of view, logic is revelatory. We have it inherently, and it reveals to us what it wishes, and it's gifts oddly seem to conform quite well to nature.

Well, it should be obvious to you what mind is. I am referring to mind in the common meaning of the word, i.e. as ...the collective aspects of intellect and consciousness which are manifest in some combination of thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination. (Wikipedia).

Then should you really differentiate between mind and mental?

It is probably as vital to the universe as matter. Not human mind, but the principle that underlies human mind, whatever that may be.

I like your views on mind my friend. You give it quite a bit of importance. :)

[Thomas Knierim]

Scameter: Exactly my point. We can't know anything for certain, much less any actual truths about the universe or it's metaphysical attributes; it's all opinion, which is why no knowledge is truly objective.

It seems that we can know some things for certain. As previously mentioned, experience itself is certain. There is no doubt that the states of mind are exactly the states of mind. Furthermore, analytic a priori statements are certain, for example: "every triangle has three sides", as well as all other logical statements. About the world there cannot be any certainty, but there are models which can be corroborated and which we accept as real by convention. This includes the entire domain of science. Then there is revelatory knowledge, the type of knowledge which reveals aspects of reality in a non-intellectual way, and of which the religions often talk. For example, Christians talk about knowing God, knowing soul, and so on. Buddhists talk about knowing karma, knowing previous existences, etc. This type of knowledge is the most uncertain type and it is therefore often disputed.

I think we can perhaps agree that reality is a superset of what is humanly intelligible, or the other way round, the domain of human intelligibility is a subset of reality. The deep questions in philosophy, such as the free will question and the explanatory gap in the mind/body problem are questions which lead outside the domain of human intelligibility. I have the strong feeling that we are not wired to be able to understand these things, just as dogs are not wired to understand realtivity theory. :lol:

Cheers, Thomas

[scameter]

It seems that we can know some things for certain. As previously mentioned, experience itself is certain. There is no doubt that the states of mind are exactly the states of mind.

I disagree.

Furthermore, analytic a priori statements are certain, for example: "every triangle has three sides", as well as all other logical statements.

Yes, I agree, some things are certain: that which we specifically engineer to be certain, such as math. But, naturally occuring things, especially life in general, is never certain, and cannot be, mianly because of our inherent subjectivity.

About the world there cannot be any certainty, but there are models which can be corroborated and which we accept as real by convention. This includes the entire domain of science.

Which is mainly dominated by the philosophy of common sense. This requires basic assumption that reality is exactly as it is perceived, and requires no further doubt; which is much of why science is so popular. Most people do not truly wish to be skeptical, or see it as important. With science, we can be limited in our vision, which most as purely fine with.

Then there is revelatory knowledge, the type of knowledge which reveals aspects of reality in a non-intellectual way, and of which the religions often talk.

I personally doubt the validity of revelatory knowledge as well as intellectual knowledge, because of both's subjectivity.

I think we can perhaps agree that reality is a superset of what is humanly intelligible, or the other way round, the domain of human intelligibility is a subset of reality.

Somewhat; but I do believe thoroughly that we are capable of speculating beyond what we perceive. Mainly through use of doubt.

The deep questions in philosophy, such as the free will question and the explanatory gap in the mind/body problem are questions which lead outside the domain of human intelligibility.

Indeed. Which is much of why I love philosophy.

I have the strong feeling that we are not wired to be able to understand these things, just as dogs are not wired to understand realtivity theory.

I agree, and I believe that is mainly because we are subjective, as well as limited in our consciousness. However, we can definitely understand that which we construct from the perceptions we receive from reality, such as science and math, because they do not require thought about things not immediately tangible.